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Federalism: An Antidote to Congress's
Separation of Powers Anxiety and
Executive Order 13,083
BRiAN E. BAiLEY*
"Stroke of a pen .... Law of the land. Kind of cool."'

"States' rights do not get in the way when someone has something he wants
to do .... Liberal Democrats or conservative Republicanstheyjust go whoosh."2
INTRODUCTION

On May 14, 1998, President Clinton signed Executive Order ("E.O.") 13,083
entitled "Federalism" while attending an economic summit of industrial nations in
Birmingham, England The order enumerated nine nonexclusive conditions
permitting federal agencies to formulate and implement federal policy while
limiting, or foreclosing altogether, state policymaking authority.4 E.O. 13,083 also
expressly revoked two previous executive orders which had favored state authority
over federal agency policymaking discretion.' Strangely, although E.O. 13,083
encouraged federal agencies to consult with state and local governments when
federal agency actions had "federalism implications,"6 President Clinton failed to
confer with state and local governments before he issued the order.7
The resulting outcry from state and local governmental organizations prompted
a swift congressional response. Both Houses of Congress moved to block
implementation of the order, that would have given federal agencies almost
unlimited power to regulate. Reasons such as a need for uniform national standards;
the increased cost of decentralization; or even the reluctance of states to regulate,
fearing the flight of businesses to more commercially amenable jurisdictions, would
have justified federal agency regulation under E.O. 13,083.8 Congress, sensing a
clear threat both to state autonomy and its own lawmaking power, acted to quell the
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1997,
Wabash College. I want to thank my wonderful wife Nicole for her patience, love, and
support. I also want to thank Professor Robert L. Fischman for his helpful comments on an
earlier draflt.
1. James Bennet, True to Form,ClintonShifts EnergiesBack to US. Focus,N.Y. TIMES,

July 5, 1998, § 1, at 10 (Paul Begala's pithy summation of the President's E.O. strategy).
2. David S. Broder, White House to Rewrite FederalismOrder,Now With State-Local
Input, WAsH. POST., July 29, 1998, at A19 (quoting Rep. Bernard Sanders's diagnosis

Congress's federalism schizophrenia).
3. See David S. Broder, Executive Order Urged Consulting,but Didn't; State, Local
Officials Want FederalismSay, WAH. POST, July 16, 1998, at Al5.
4. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. 146, 148 (1999) (entitled 'Tederalism"),
reprintedin 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1999).

5. Id.at 149.
6. Id. at 148.
7. See Broder, supra note 3, at Al5.

8. Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. 146.
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executive intrusion. Under fire from Congress and state and local governmental
organizations, the President quickly relented by suspending the executive order.9
From the ashes of E.O. 13,083's suspension arose a new executive order on
federalism to which Congress has not yet responded.' This Note, however, focuses
on Congress's "anxiety" over E.O. 13,083, its use of federalism as a counterattack,
and suggestions on how Congress might eliminate these executive breaches of state
sovereignty.
This Note will begin by examining on E.O. 13,083's potential transformation of
state and federal cooperation in the policymaking arena. E.O. 13,083 explicitly
abandoned safeguards, embodied in two previous executive orders," that protected
states from federal agency overreach. Comparing the two orders highlights two
distinct visions of the balance of power between state capitals and Washington, D.C.
Earlier executive orders reflect sincere regard for state sovereignty and distrust of
agency discretion with respect to federalism. E.O. 13,083, in contrast, disfavored
state policymaking competence and preferred federal agency intervention.
Part II of this Note will address Congress's uncharacteristic protection of
federalism with its challenge to E.O. 13,083. Federalism as well as separation of
powers concerns animated the congressional response, although the arguments
against E.O. 13,083 were cloaked mainly in the garb ofpreserving state sovereignty.
By passing resolutions 2 condemning the order and sponsoring bills 3 to circumvent
its application, Congress acted as a political safeguard for federalism. In this regard,
this Note will examine the connection between federalism and underlying
substantive policy issues.
The notion that the political branches, rather than the judiciary, should be
responsible for upholding federalism has supported a doctrine of noninterference by
the courts. 4 Part III of this Note will discuss the re-emergence of federalism as an
active governing principle through the political process. When Congress pressured
President Clinton into suspending the order, it enforced federalism politically. The
Supreme Court has relied on thepolitical branches to enforce federalism even though

9. See Exec. Order No. 13,095, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1999) (entitled "Suspension of Executive
Order 13,083"), reprintedin 5 U.S.CA. § 601 (West Supp. 1999).
10. Exec. Order No. 13,132 (to be codified at 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255) (1999), available in
1999 WL 594172. This order embodies similar power-shifting principles that are found in
E.O. 13,083: (1) federal agencies may construe federal regulations to preempt state authority,
"if State authority conflicts with federal authority under the Federal statute"; and (2) the order
promotes the same waiver process used in E.O. 13,083. Id. Clinton's latest order revokes his
own E.O. 13,083 as well as Reagan's E.O. 12,612. See id. Thus far neither Congress nor state
and local governmental organizations have publicly criticized Clinton's newest order.
11. Exec. Order 13,083, 3 C.F.R. at 149 (revoking President Reagan's E.O. 12,612
limiting federal agency policymaking and President Clinton's own E.O. 12,875 proscribing
agency issuance of unfunded mandates).
12. See H.R. Con. Res. 299, 105th Cong. (1998).
13. See H.R. 4196, 105th Cong. (1998) (entitled "State Sovereignty Act of 1998"); S.
2445, 105th Cong. (1998) (entitled "Federalism Enforcement Act of 1998").
14. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)
(holding that Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to apply federal minimum
wage and overtime protection to state employees).
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the interests of state governments and the federal government at times do not
however, the politicalbranches
coincide with the constitutional division ofpower. If,
are to assume responsibility for protecting the federal-state balance, then Congress
must take this opportunity to establish safeguards from federal agency encroachment
on state autonomy. Congress, furthermore, must limit agency discretion with
carefully drafted statutes and force its lawmakers to formulate Federalism
Assessments when legislative proposals have federalism implications. Taking these
simple steps will bridle an aggressive executive branch and restrain lawmakers from
proposing laws which unconstitutionally preempt state authority.
I. SPARRING OVER FEDERALISM
A brief background sketch of the President's and Congress's authority over
executive agencies will provide context to the brawl over E.O. 13,083. Article H,
Section 2 ofthe U.S. Constitution augured the eventual arrival of an administrative
bureaucracy by mentioning "Heads of Departments."" The Constitution, though,
vested the creation of these departments solely within the power of Congress, as
directed by the Necessary and Proper Clause.' 6 Combining these clauses allows
Congress to grant to a "Head of a Department" executive powers that Article II had
not directly reserved to the President 7
Once Congress has formed a department or agency, the President assumes general
administrative control over the ordinary duties of such department's or agency's
officers.'" Yet, the Take Care Clause tempers this general administrative control;' 9
the President is constitutionally charged to ensure that executive officials follow
Congress's instructions. When Congress imposes a duty on an executive official, the
control of the law supersedes a President's direction.2" Though the Take Care Clause
has been a fertile source of broad Presidential claims ofauthority, the Supreme Court
has rejected this line.2'
Congressional control over administrative agencies is limited, but its breadth
"encompass[es] the power to create, abolish, and locate agencies and to define the
powers, duties, tenure, compensation, and other incidents of the offices within

15. See Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency
Decisionmakers:The Rise andDemise oftheReaganAdministration's Theory ofthe Unitary
Exe~utive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 650 (1989) (construing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl.
2).
16. See id. (construing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
17. See id.
18. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,135 (1926); see also Peter Strauss, ThePlace
ofAgencies in Government:SeparationofPowers and the FourthBranch,84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 587 (1984) (observing that agencies operate under highly centralized presidential
control).
19. See Rosenberg, supranote 15, at 650-51 (commenting on U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
20. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838).
21. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
(holding that President Truman did not have authority to seize private property to insure steel
production).
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them."22 When the President and Congress clash over executive agency control, the
Supreme Court adopts a balancing test which has favored Congress in important
separation of powers cases. 3 The Court weighs the justifications for congressional
maneuvering, coupled with the necessity to maintain Congress's Article I powers,
against the degree of intrusion on the President's ability to act according to his
assigned duties.
The President often flexes his Article II muscle by issuing executive orders.
Though not labeled as an executive order at the time, George Washington issued a
neutrality proclamation enjoining all U.S. citizens from conduct which might
provoke a belligerent power.24 Lincoln was the first President to issue an executive
order as it is known today, though executive orders were not numbered until 1907
when the State Department organized numerically all of the orders it had filed.'
Franklin D. Roosevelt greatly expanded the authority of the executive order while
creating New Deal executive agencies. By April 1942, thirty-five federal agencies
operated purely by presidential generation.26 Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter
added to the executive's burgeoning authority by increasing oversight programs
during the 1970s economic crisis. 27 Later, President Reagan, frustrated by an
opposition-controlled Congress, deployed executive orders to deregulate
administrative agencies.28
A. Executive Order 13,083's Predecessors
Part of Reagan's plan in deregulating federal agencies included mandating
agencies to treat federalism issues carefully. To understand clearly the implications
of E.O. 13,083, one must examine Reagan predecessors, E.O. 12,372" and E.O.
12,612.30 E.O. 12,372 reformed an Office ofManagement and Budget bureaucratic
form used to resolve federal-state disputes over federal grants and expenditures. This
executive order directed federal officials to "accommodate to" a designated state

22. Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 695.
23. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,412 (1989) (upholding placement
of commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines inthe judicial branch); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654,696-97 (1988) (holding that Congress actedwithin its authority in creating an
Independent Counsel to investigate the executive branch).
24. See FrankB. Cross, Executive Orders12,291 and 12,498.A Test Case in Presidential
ControlofExecutive Agencies, 4 J.L. &PoL. 483, 485 (1988).
25. See id. at486 n.5.
26. See id. at 491 n.40.
27. See id. at 493-94.
28. See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 628.
29. Exec. OrderNo. 12,372,3 C.F.R. 197 (1983) (entitled"Intergovennmental Reviewof
Federal Programs"), reprintedin 31 U.S.C. § 6506 (1994).
30. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988) (entitled "Federalism"), reprintedin 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
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contact or explain why the federal official could not make such an accommodation. 3'
As a result, state officials had the ability to contribute meaningfully and
determinatively regarding federal aid disbursement and grant development.32
Borne of an intense collaborative effort among federal, state, and local
governmental representatives, E.O. 12,612 continued the shift from federal agency
discretion to state power and responsibility. 3 E.O. 12,612 established nine
fundamental federalism principles that laid a foundation for the order's subsequent
policymaking guidelines and expressed normative values offederalism. The first of
these values is the belief that limiting the scope and power of the national
government preserves the political liberty of the people.34 A second and commonly
cited value of federalism is the competency of the states to solve localized problems
more effectively than the national government 3 The order also cites the benefits of
allowing states to experiment with diverse public policies.36
The most important principle E.O. 12,612 enunciated is the presumption of state
sovereignty. Before an agency could issue a regulation, it must have had clear
constitutional and statutory authority. When any uncertainty arose as to an agency's
authority, a presumption resolved against national regulation. " This provision
protected against poorly drafted legislation and curtailed agency discretion.
In addition to outlining basic federalism principles, E.O. 12,612 established
important policymaking criteria. First, the order re-emphasized the consultation
process established by E.O. 12,372. When federal agencies limited the
"policymaking discretion" of states, they were required to consult with a designated
state official and work with states in developing policies." An additional criterion
similar to the presumption principle was that the authority for agencyregulation had
to be certain and clear.39
E.O. 12,612 also instituted important preemption rules. Before an agency could
construe a federal statute to preempt state law, the statute had to authorize
preemption expressly, or there had to be firm evidence that Congress intended to
preempt state law.4" Where the statute did not preempt state law but allowed for
agency rulemaking, the statute had to give an agency express authorization to issue

31. Executive Order 12,372, 3 C.F.R. 197.
32. See Clinton-Gorev. State andLocal Governments: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Nat ' Econ. Growth, NaturalResources, and Regulatory Affairs of the House Comm. on
Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 161 (1998) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of
Michael Horowitz, a Senior Fellowofthe Hudson Institute and the self-described "pointman"
for the Reagan Administration's efforts to promote federalism).
33. See id. at 157-58.
34. See Executive Order 12,612, 3 C.F.R. at 253.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 254.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 255.
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preemptive regulations.41 E.O. 12,612, moreover, forbade agencies from submitting
legislative proposals, inconsistent with E.O. 12,612's principles and policymaking
criteria, which would have preempted state law.42
Finally, E.O. 12,612 directed each agency to designate an official who would
ensure the order's implementation. This official was charged with preparing a
"Federalism Assessment" when proposed policies had "sufficient federalism
implications."4 3 A proper Federalism Assessment identified policies inconsistent
with E.O. 12,612 and calculated the financial burden a state had to bear.44 An
accurate assessment also identified to what extent such a policy interfered with the
4
state's discharge of its "traditional... governmental functions." 1
The Reagan Administration holds no monopoly over policies favorable to state and
local governmental authority. The Clinton Administration had acted favorably
toward federalism in late 1992 through the fall of 1993.46 For example, President
Clinton issued E.O. 12,866"7 improving regulatory cost/benefit analysis for executive
agencies. In October 1993, the Clinton Administration ordered federal agencies to
desist from issuing unfunded mandates.48 (Two years later Congress passed a law
prohibiting a federal agency from imposing heavy financialburdens on states, unless
the federal government provided funds to bear the cost of regulation.49 ) If the federal
government cannot or will not finance the cost of the agency regulation, state and
local governmental officials have the opportunity to provide timely and meaningful
information for the development of regulatory proposals.
In addition to executive orders favoring state authority and responsibility, the
Clinton Administration conferred with state and local governmental groups on
important reform issues. The Clinton Administration consulted with the states on
welfare reform and children's health initiatives.Y State and local governments also
participated in programmatic and administrative reforms of Medicaid."' Safe
drinking water amendments were an additional source of intergovernmental
2
cooperation.1

41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 254.
46. See Hearings,supra note 32, at 110 (testimony of Dan Blue, North Carolina House
of Representatives and President of the National Conference of State Legislatures).
47. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (entitled "Regulatory Planning and
Review"), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
48. See Exec. Order No. 12,875, 3 C.F.R. 669, 670 (1994) (entitled "Enhancing the
Intergovernmental Partnership"), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
49. See generallyUnfunded Mandates ReformAct of 1995,2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-71 (Supp.
IV 1998). A federal agency, however, is free to regulate unless the cost to the state is
$100,000,000 or more. See id. § 1532.
50. See Hearings,supra note 32, at 110 (testimony of Dan Blue, North Carolina House
of Representatives and President of the National Conference of State Legislatures).
51. See id.
52. See id.
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To allow for more effective communication between federal agencies and state
governments, E.O. 12,875, "Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership,"
increased the flexibility of the waiver process. 3 States, wishing to avoid federal
agency regulations, could submit alternative policy approaches. In turn, federal
agencies had to respond to a state alternative policy in less than 120 days. 4 If a
federal agency rejected the proposed policy, it had to explain to the state government
why it declined the alternative. Thus, on the whole, these contributions from the
Clinton Administration favored state and local governments by easing the costs of
regulations and encouraging meaningful communication between federal agencies
and state governments.
B. Executive Order 13,083's PotentialTransformation
ofAgency Power andDiscretion

In stark contrast to the shifting of authority to state governments and general
intergovernmental cooperation, Clinton's E.O. 13,083, "Federalism," threatened to
divest state governments of the sovereignty they had recaptured through prior
Reagan and Clinton Administration executive orders. Specifically, President Clinton
revoked both Reagan's E.O. 12,612, "Federalism" and his own E.O. 12,875,
"Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership."55 E.O. 13,083, "Federalism,"
retained most ofthe language found in Reagan's federalism orderbut excised crucial
components. 6 In place of his deletions, one finds nine nonexclusive conditions
allowing federal agencies to preempt state authority.
Missing from E.O. 13,083 was the presumption of state sovereignty found in
Reagan's E.O. 12,612. Federal regulatory agencies, under Clinton's E.O. 13,083,
could have regulated when constitutional or statutory authority to act was unclear or
uncertain. The traditional dual sovereignty approach, firmly ensconced in Reagan's
order, is negated. Also absent from E.O. 13,083 are the preemption provisions
ordering agencies to scrutinize statutory authority carefully before preempting state
law. 57 E.O. 13,083, likewise, discarded the Federalism Assessment, formerly
required when a federal agency proposed regulation with "sufficient federalism
implications. 5 8
The nine nonexclusive conditions inspired heated responses from state and local
governmental organizations and Congress. 9 E.O. 13,083 attempted to distinguish

53. Executive Order 12,875, 3 C.F.R at 670.
54. See id.
55. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R 146, 149 (1999) (entitled "Federalism"),
reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (West Supp. 1999).
56. Id. (E.O. 13,083, except for removing an explicit reference to the Tenth Amendment
and a presumption favoring State authority, uses almost verbatim the federalism principles
found in E.O. 12,612).
57. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252, 255 (1988) (entitled "Federalism"),
reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
58. Id.at 255-56.
59. See Hearings,supranote 32, at 9. Representative David M. Mcintosh was astonished
by the order considering President Clinton's experience as a governor, stating that President
Clinton's order "swept away [important] limitations onthepower ofthe federal government"
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matters of national or multistate scope from matters that are merely common to the
states. Understandably, federal agencies may regulate when the issue involves
national or multistate concerns. The difficulty arises in defining what exactly is a
national concern. E.O. 13,083's ambiguous and broad definitions of national
concerns dangerously abridged state authority and responsibility.
A federal agency could have regulated when the matter "occurr[ed] interstate as
opposed to being contained within one State's boundary."6 This language appeared
to grant regulatory authority over matters that were merely common to the states,
thus, destroying a need for the distinction between national concerns and concerns
merely common to the states. The word "interstate" echoes the Commerce Clause,6'
but E.O. 13,083 omits any other qualifier, such as a matter relating to commerce. In
effect, the executive order leaves the protection of state authority to the discretion of
a federal agency official.
Similarly, E.O. 13,083's language permitted federal agency regulation under
almost any imaginable scenario. Subsection 3(d) (2) justified federal regulation when
the source of harm sprung from a state different from the state experiencing a
significant amount of harm.62 This subsection logically followed the interstate
language of the first subsection but did not limit federal agency discretion. An
agency also could have regulated when it perceived a need for uniform national
standards.63 Furthermore, when decentralization increased the cost of government,
federal agencies could have issued regulations."' Federal agencies would have had
additional rulemaking discretion when states failed to protect "individual rights and
liberties" adequately.65 Finally, if states hesitated to impose regulation, fearing the
relocation of business to other states, federal agencies would again have had
discretion to regulate.66
In addition to subverting state autonomy, E.O. 13,083 challenges the Senate's
power to ratify treaties.67 A matter relating to an international obligation would
justify regulation by a federal agency under E.O. 13,083.68 Depending on how
broadly one defined an international obligation, executive agencies could have forced
states to obey treaties to which the Senate never consented. This concern, in
particular, prompted drafting of a House Concurrent Resolution condemning E.O.
13,083.69

Id.
60. Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. at 148.
61. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
62. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. at 148.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 2.
68. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. at 148.
69. See 144 CONG.REc. H6870-01 (daily ed. July 31,1998) (statement ofRepresentative
Collins criticizing the order for threatening "[to] impos[e] on States and the American people
provisions of international treaties or agreements that have not been ratified by the Senate.");
see also H.R. Con. Res. 299, 105th Cong. (1998). The Clinton Administration, nonetheless,
may not need to rely on federal agencies to impose unratified international treaties or
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II. THE POLITICAL PROCESS AT WORK

Before the House introduced the Concurrent Resolution, Representative Barr
sponsored a bill mandating that federal agencies comply with President Reagan's
E.O. 12,612, "Federalism."7" The bill also specified that Clinton's E.O. 13,083
would have no force or effect. Representative Barr's bill initiated a series of
resolutions and hearings which galvanized state and local governmental
organizations into action.
Both the lack of prior consultation and the breadth of E.O. 13,083's sweeping
provisions forged a strong alliance. The National Governor's Association was
unaware of the order's existence until notified by a member ofthe Subcommittee on
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs. 71 As the
news spread to other state and local governmental organizations, the leaders of the
"Big Seven "72 mobilized to force the order's withdrawal. At first, the Clinton
Administration refused to withdraw the order and only offered to delay the effective
date of the order from mid-August to mid-November.73
Finding the Clinton Administration's response unacceptable, Congress initiated
hearings on E.O. 13,083 and invited leaders from the "Big Seven" and Clinton
Administration officials to discuss the need for the order. The leaders of the "Big
Seven" denounced E.O. 13,083 because it would have fundamentally shifted the
federal-state balance of power. 4 Some complained about the deletion of the
Federalism Assessment.7" Others criticized the order on account of the broad
subjective criteria which displaced previous preemption limits.76

agreements on the United States. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sent a letter "to
numerous foreign ministers" assuring them that the United States would observe the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty despite its rejection by the Senate. See Bill Gertz, Albright
Says U.S. Bound by Nuke Pact:Sends Letters to Nations Despite Senate Vote, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1999, at Al.
70. See H.R. 4196, 105th Cong. (1998) (entitled "State Sovereignty Act of 1998").
71. See Hearings,supranote 32, at 10 (statement of Representative Mcintosh, Chainnan
of the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory
Affairs). A member of the Subcommittee first called the National Governor's Association
("NGA") to ascertain the organization's views and was shocked to learn the Executive
Director of NGA had never heard of the order. See id. William T. Pound, executive director
of the National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL"), called the lack of consultation a
"slap in the face." Broder, supranote 3, at Al 5.
72. See Hearings,supra note 32, at 10. The "Big Seven" constitutes the National
Governor's Association ("NGA"), National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL"),
NationalAssociation ofCounties (NACO"), United States Conference ofMayors ("USCM"),
National League of Cities ("NLC"), International City/County Management Association
("ICMA"), and Council of State Governments ("CSG"). See id.
73. See Broder, supra note 2, at Al 9.
74. See id.
75. See Hearings,supra note 32, at 170 (statement of Eugene Hickok, former Justice
Department official underAttomey General Edwin Meese III and fornermember ofReagan's
White House Working Group on Federalism).
76. See id. at 139 (testimony of Betty Lou Ward, President of NACO).
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An official from the Office of Management and Budget defended E.O. 13,083 on
the grounds that it constituted an update of E.O. 12,612, "Federalism," and E.O.
12,875, "Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership."' The official maintained
that the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act ("UMRA"),n recent Supreme Court
decisions, and the structure of the Constitution itself left the previous orders
outdated. 9 UMRA, according to the Administration official, supplanted E.O.
12,612's analysis of federalism implications. Under E.O. 12,612 agencies were
required to document proposed regulations having federalism implications and
prepare a cost/benefit analysis. UMRA requires a statement to be issued only when
a regulation would result in an expense of at least $100,000,000 to a state or local
government."0 In addition to UMRA's preemption of the Reagan order, the
Administration asserted that E.O. 13,083 improved the waiver application process
through which states could have requested to remove themselves from regulation.8
Despite this defense, in the face of stiff resistance from both Congress and the "Big
Seven," President Clinton quickly suspended the executive order.'
E.O. 13,083's suspension did nothing to allaythe concerns ofthe "Big Seven!' and
members of Congress. The power struggle between the executive department, the
105th Congress, and state governments did not culminate until the introduction of
the "Federalism Enforcement Act of 1998" ("FEA") in the U.S. Senate.' The bill
essentiallycodifiedE.O. 12,612, usingtheReagan order's language almostverbatim.
FEA would restore the Reagan order's presumption against federal agency regulation
and its preemption standards. Under E.O. 12,612, agencies were to err on the side
of state sovereignty when in doubt about their authority to regulate. Moreover, FEA
would require agencies to prepare a Federalism Assessment when federal agency
regulations would involve significant federalism implications.'
FEA differs from E.O. 12,612 in that it only expresses the "sense of Congress" that
agencies not prepare legislative proposals which would interfere with state
functions.85 Senator Thompson, who introduced FEA, recognized that only the
President could enforce legislative proposal requirements with his Article II

77. See id. at 198 (testimony of G. Edward Deseve, Acting Deputy Director for
Management and Controller, Office of Management and Budget).
78. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-71 (Supp. IV 1998).
79. See Hearings,supranote 32, at 198 (testimony of G. Edward Deseve, Acting Deputy
Director for Management and Controller, Office of Management and Budget).
80. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (Supp. IV 1998); see also supra text accompanying note 49.
81. See Hearings,supra note 32, at 176 (statement of G. Edward Deseve, Acting Deputy
Director for Management and Controller, Office of Management and Budget).
82. See Exec. Order No. 13,095, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1999) (entitled "Suspension of Executive
Order 13,083"), reprintedin 5U.S.CA. § 601 (West Supp. 1999). Apparently, the President
is prepared for another bout with Congress over his latest federalism executive order. See
supratext accompanying notes 9-10.
83. S. 2445, 105th Cong. (1998). Senator Thompson still viewed E.O. 13,083 as a threat
to state sovereignty and requested that President Clinton revoke the order permanently. See
144 CoNG. REc. S9976 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1998).

84. See S.2445, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998).
85. Id.
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powers. 6 The bill, however, ultimately died in the Comnnittee on Governmental
Affairs at the end of the legislative year. Though Congress failed to enact legislation
protecting federalism, the legislature sent a strong message that state authority (at
least as it relates to federal agency regulation) will be protected.
A. Federalism:Framingthe Debate

Congress, despite its rhetorical flourish about state sovereignty and responsibility,
was motivated by other concerns when it challenged Clinton's order. Some in
Congress viewed the his executive order as another avenue through which President
Clinton planned to bypass the national legislature. 7 Separation of powers issues
permeated much of the debate and discussion about state sovereignty. Federalism,
therefore, served as a convenient "surrogate"88 through which Congress could
restrain executive encroachment on legislative power.
Federalism often provides a useful tool for proponents on either side of the
ideological spectrum to frame a debate. Federalism often masks disagreement over
basic social or political issues. Recently, gun owner and manufacturer advocates
adopted state sovereignty arguments to challenge a provision of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act, requiring local law enforcement officials to conduct
criminal background checks on prospective hand gun buyers.89 In Printzv. United
States, the Supreme Court held that criminal background checks conducted by local
officials "directly conscript[ed] State officers to execute federal law."9 Gun owners
and gun manufacturers, however, probably would not support state autonomy as
aggressively should states begin to devise strict gun control enactments. 9' At that
juncture, gun owners and gun manufacturers would jettison state sovereignty

86. See 144 CONG. REC. S9976-77 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1998).
87. See Hearings,supranote 32, at 27 (statement of Rep. Bob Barr).
88. Norman Redlich & David R. Lurie, Federalism:A SurrogateforWhatReallyMatters,
23 Omo N.U. L. REv. 1273, 1273 (1997). The thrust ofthis article asserts that federalism is
a tool for political debates that have little to do with allocating power between state and
federal governments. Political leaders use federalism to frame debates around conservative
and liberal public policy positions. State autonomy has often been used as an argument to
withstand progressive federal enactments. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values ofFederalism,
47 FLA. L. REv. 499, 500 (1995). In the early nineteenth century southern states camouflaged
opposition to federal action limiting slavery with arguments about State sovereignty and the
concept of interposition. See SAmUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 224, 316 (1993) (describing John Calhoun's vision of state's rights
and interposition). After the Civil War, southern states objected to a federal military presence
which they viewed as an infringement of state autonomy and federalism. Federalism was also
used to counter progressive era federal laws reforming child labor conditions, enacting a
minimum wage, and regulating business monopolies. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating federal regulation ofemployment); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that federal government could not regulate child labor); United
States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that businesses engaged in production, not
commerce, could not be regulated by the Sherman Antitrust Act).
89. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994)).
90. 521 U.S. 898, 914-15 (1997).
91. See Redlich & Lurie, supranote 88, at 1283-84.
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Amendment and other constitutional challenges
principles and would adopt Second
92
to dispute state sovereignty.
Other highly politically charged policy issues, such as abortion, could force
advocates to embrace either state autonomy or federal preemption doctrine
depending on the nature of the political threat. For instance, President Clinton and
pro-choice advocates oppose "partial birth" abortion bans93 because they limit
treatment options by physicians.94 However, a "conservative federalist' might also
denounce the ban as an affront to reserved traditional state powers over family,
marriage, or crime. If Congress enacted a federal ban, pro-choice advocates would
soon trumpet the fundamental authority of states to ban "partial birth" abortions.95
Furthermore, typically "liberal" criminal defendant attorneys find themselves
favoring state sovereignty in opposition to the increasing federalization of crimes.96
Criminal defendants would rather face state authorities and judicial systems than the
federal government's panoply of resources aimed at reducing crime. Furthermore,
a criminal defendant convicted under federal law will more likely suffer longer
prison sentences and more severe penalties.97 Thus, criminal defense attorneys attack

Congress's use of the Commerce Power vis-A-vis state autonomy as the basis for
federal criminal statutes.98
B. Federalism as Principleand Rhetoric

Likewise, the dispute over E.O. 13,083 was as much a skirmish over separation
of powers as it was a conflict over federalism. E.O. 13,083 constituted one of many
1998 Clinton Administrationinitiatives circumventing congressional authorization.
In July of 1998, with White House advisers pessimistic that the 105th Congress
would pass any major legislation, President Clinton "plann[ed] to issue a series of
executive orders to demonstrate that he [could] still be effective." 99 Clinton's senior

92. See id. at 1282-83.
93. See Redlich & Lurie, supranote 88,at 1284-85; see, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion Ban

Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997).
94. President Clinton stated he would support a ban only ifan exception were allowed for

the life and health of the mother. See Katherine Q.Seelye, States OutlawLate Abortions as
a FederalBan Facesa Veto, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at Al.
95. See Redlich & Lurie, supranote 88, at 1284.
96. See Andrew Weis, Note, Commerce Clause in the CrossHairs: The Use of LopezBasedMotions to Challengethe ConstitutionalityofFederalCriminalStatutes, 48 STAN. L.
REv. 1431 (1996).
97. See generally Greg Hollon, Note, After the FederalizationBinge: A Civil Liberties
Hangover,31 HARV.C.R.- C.L. L. REV.499 (1996) (comparing harsh federal sentences with
generally more lenient state sentences for the same conduct).
98. See, e.g.,United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995) (failed challenge to
federal carjacking statute); United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995) (failed
challenge to statute proscripting possession of a firearm by a felon)
99. Bennet, supra note 1, at 10.
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policy adviser, RahmEmanuel, announced, "'[The President] [i]s readyto work with
will work with him. But ifthey choose partisanship, he will choose
Congress ifthey
00
progress."
The President launched a mid-summer domestic policy bonanza, first focusing on
the safety offruit andvegetable juice. Finding Congress unwilling to legislate on this
issue, President Clinton later signed E.O. 13,100 to establish the President's Council
on Food Safety.10' The President also planned to issue an executive order to make
health care more accessible to federal employees." Clinton had previously expanded
coverage under Medicare health insurance for the elderly and ordered federal
agencies to enlist millions more poor children for Medicaid. 3
Even critics outside the Republican-controlled Congress agreed that President
Clinton was stretching the legal limits ofhis authority. Professor David Schoenbrod,
a New York Law School professor, faulted Clinton for "'consistently trying to take
more power than Congress gives him.."."I Jeremy Taylor, Director of Natural
Resource Studies at the Cato Institute, claims that President Clinton distinguishes
himself from other Presidents by his aggressive expansion of authority.0 However,
Taylor correctlyblames Congress for allowingthe Presidentto usurp Congress's own
fuels presidential encroachment by delegating broad
powers. Congress often
06
discretionary authority.
In addition to protecting against presidential usurpation and asserting Congress's
power to make law,0 7 many of the Republican Congress's own policy proposals
contradict a professed reverence for state authority and responsibility. Neither the
104th nor the 105th Congress was a shining example of a principled protector of
state sovereignty. A number of "conservative" policy objectives have undermined or
threatened to undermine state authority and responsibility, beginning with the
"Contract with America." Among other affronts to state autonomy, the "Contract
with America" contained a plan to "refor" the common law of torts of each state

100. Elizabeth Shogren, Clinton to Bypass Congress in Blitz ofExecutive Orders, L.A.
TIMEs, July 4, 1998, atAl.
101. See Exec. Order 13,100, 3 C.F.R. 209 (1999), reprintedin 21 U.S.C.A. § 341 (West
Supp. 1999).
102. See Bennett, supranote 1, at 10.
103. See Shogren, supra note 100, at Al.
104. Editorial, King Clinton, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1998, atA14.
105. See Robert Pear, The PresidentialPen Is Still Mighty, N.Y. TiMEs, June 28, 1998, §
4, at 3.
106. See id. § 4, at 3. The article cites a classic illustration of lethargic congressional
delegation when it mandated that the poor have access to the Internet and other
communication outlets. Congress characteristically allowed the Federal Communications
Commission ('FCC") to iron outthe details. Congress was"shocked" whenthe FCC proposed
a new tax to pay for Congress's "universal access." Id.
107. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
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by establishing federal limits on punitive damage recovery.' ° Moreover, Republican
proposals would have increased federal interference in state law enforcement by
forcing states to alter their sentencing practices.' 0 9

Congress has also strictly limited the length of time during which welfare
recipients can collect payments and precluded legal aliens from collecting welfare
altogether."' A witness present at the E.O. 13,083 congressional hearings criticized
the current Congress for efforts to preempt state authority to tax goods and services
through the Internet. "' The witness also worried abouttelecommunication proposals,
federal tax reform,
and electric utility deregulation that may substantially diminish
2
autonomy.1
state
"Conservative" Republicans as well as "liberal" Democrats, thus, have shown an
ability to discard federalism principles for political gain. Though many Republican
leaders sincerely viewed E.O. 13,083 as a threat to state autonomy, Clinton's
executive order stimulated a separation of powers conflict framed by federalism
rhetoric. With mixed motives, Congress challenged the President on the executive
order and achieved a temporary victory. This highly political process and legislative
maneuvering secured, for the advocates of state autonomy, an important check on
executive agency policymaking discretion.
III. CONGRESS AS A POLITICAL SAFEGUARD FOR FEDERALISM

Some scholars and Justices of the Supreme Court have envisioned the political
branches as the proper repositories of federalism safeguards, rather than federal
courts as neutral arbiters over state and federal conflicts. The 105th Congress's
barrage of resolutions, bills, and hearings, in some respects, empirically supports a
political process vision of federalism. The Court, however, should not depend on
Congress and the President exclusively to referee federal-state power-sharing.
A. Tracingthe JudicialApproach to Federalism

The Court, in 1937, began to uphold federal statutes and abandon federalism-based
restraints on federal legislation." 3 In time, federalism was rarely mentioned as an

108. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT wrrH AMEMCA: THE BoLD PLAN BY REP. NEwT
GINGRICH, REP. DICKAR MYAND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NAION 146 (Ed

Gillespie & Bob Schellas eds., 1994); see also Redlich & Lurie, supra note 88, at 1280-81.
109. See Gene Nichol, The New and UnfortunateFace ofJudicialFederalism,23 Ouo
N.U. L. REv. 1197, 1203 (1997).
110. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
111. See Hearings, supra note 32, at 131 (statement of Brian O'Neill, President of the
National League of Cities and Councilman of the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
112. See id.
113. CompareNational Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937) (holding that production of materials was no longer determinative of Commerce
Clause power, rather, any production affecting interstate commerce could trigger Commerce
Clause power) with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that commerce
was a thing apart from production and mining; therefore, Congress could not regulate
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issue in Supreme Court cases while battles raged over the New Deal and the
expansion of civil rights. Instead, the Court and constitutional scholars concentrated
on the extent of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, separation of
powers, and individual rights protectedunder the Constitution." 4 Federalism did not
resurface in constitutional jurisprudence until NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,
when the Supreme Court attempted to develop, the traditional governmental
functions doctrine." 5 A traditional governmental function, such as the authority to
regulate marriage, would constitute an area "carved out" for state governments in
which Congress could not use the Commerce power to pass legislation."'
The Court quickly abandoned the traditional governmental functions standard in
Garciav. San Antonio MetropolitanTransitAuthority."7 The "confusion, wasteful
litigation, and contradictory decisions"" 18 generatedbyNationalLeague'sconception
of federalism forced the Court to abandon judicial protection of federalism. Garcia
relied on political safeguards to insure the balance of state-federal power. Building
on the political safeguard concept, the Court instituted a clear statement rule
requiring Congress to expressly refer to states before enacting regulation that would
apply to states.' 9 The Court believed that such a requirement might actually prod
considering state interests before passing laws inimical to state
Congress into
20
authority.
Recent opinions, however, indicate that the Court will not rely solely on Congress
and the President to protect federalism. The Court, reminiscent of the National
League traditional functions test, has carved out certain state governmental areas
with which Congress may not constitutionally interfere. In New York v. United
States,'2' the Court held that Congress cannot regulate states by ordering them to act
in a particular way. 2 Justice O'Connor reasoned that federal officials directing state
action would blur the lines ofpolitical accountability. 2 Federal intervention in this
manner would confuse the electorate about which state or federal official is
ultimately responsible for unwise or unwanted legislation. The Court has also, for
the first time since 1937, broadly circumscribed Congress's Commerce Clause
2
1 the Court held that the Gun Free School Zones
power. In Lopez v. United States,1
1000
feet of school grounds, exceeded the scope of the
Act, banning firearms within
2
Commerce Clause. Lastly, the Court has withheld another state governmental

production or mining).
114. See Redlich & Lurie, supra note 88, at 1274.
115. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
116. Id.
117.469 U.S. 528 (1985).
118. Id. at 554.
119. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
120. See Ann Althouse, EnforcingFederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 38 ARiz. L.
REv.793, 809 (1996).
121. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that a federal statute ordering states either to regulate
radioactive waste or take title to it violates the Tenth Amendment).
122. See id. at 161-63.
123. See id. at 168-69.
124. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
125. See id. at 567-68.
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function from Congressional arrogation. In Printzv. UnitedStates, 126 the Supreme
Court declared that Congress could not constitutionally
command states or state
127
officers to implement federal regulatory programs.
The rulings issued since New York v. UnitedStates demonstrate a new tack by the
Supreme Court, but it has not yet expressly abandoned the political safeguard
argument first articulated by Professor Herbert Wechsler in his seminal 1954 law
review article.' 28 Wechsler contended that the political process adequately protects
states and state interests. Wechsler maintained that U.S. Senate procedures, such as
the two-thirds vote requirement needed to stymie states' rights filibusters, the rigid
seniority system, and committee control shield state interests from federal
governmental meddling. In addition, before Baker v. Carr,' rural interests were
over-represented in state legislatures and guided decennial redistricting. 3 ' Wechsler
also argued that the Electoral College compels Presidential campaigns to travel to
every state. Wechsler concluded that the national political process was "well adapted
to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the cent[ral power] on the domain of
the states."''
B. The FlawedPoliticalProcessArgument
Professor Jesse H. Choper resumed the political process argument, 3 2 a rationale
supporting Garciav. SanAntonioMetropolitanTransitAuthority.133 Choper claimed
that the federal courts should refrain from wasting their adjudicative resources on
federalism cases and confine their energies to individual rights cases. He noted that
all three branches enforce the Constitution, with the political branches as the most
appropriate enforcers of federalism.'34 Choper updated some of Wechsler's
arguments and added his own political process grounds for political branch
protection of state autonomy.
Building on Wechsler's argument about the Senate and House of Representatives
as protectors of state interests, Choper posits that the basic political orientation ofthe
national legislature's members inherently guards states from federal intrusion.
Because as many as three-fourths of senators and representatives graduate from state
and municipal offices, they will be inclined to consider the effects national
legislation will have on states.'35 The emergence of the intergovernmental lobby also
has provided states and localities with a strong voice in Washington, D.C.
Organizations such as the National Governor's Association, the Council of State

126. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
127. Id. at 935.
128. Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards ofFederalism: The Role ofthe States in
the Compositionand Selection ofthe NationalGovernment, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
129. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that each citizen's vote should weigh equally).
130. See Wechsler, supranote 128, at 548-52.
131. Id. at 558.
132. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEw AND THE NATIONAL PoLmcAL PRocEss
(1980).
133. 469 U.S. 528, 551 n.ll (1985).
134. See CHOPER, supranote 132, at 236-37.
135. See id. at 178-79.
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Governments, and the National League of Cities have the requisite knowledge of
state and local concerns and the power to influence both national legislation and
federal agency regulation. 3 '
The skirmish over E.O. 13,083 exemplifies the power the "intergovernmental
lobby" can wield over the national political process. The "Big Seven" in tandem with
"conservative" Republican congressional leaders forced the President to suspend
E.O. 13,083 atleasttemporarily. National newspaper coverage-spurredbythe "Big
Seven's" anxiety over regulatory agency preemption, congressional hearings, and a
plethora of bills and resolutions-swelled against Clinton's new initiative. Rather
than risk further alienation of these state and local governmental organizations, the
President acquiesced.
One can reasonably conclude that the political process succeeded in protecting
state interests with respect to E.O. 13,083. However, the states' victory, in this
instance, is not compelling evidence that the federal judiciary should leave
federalism issues to the political branches. Professor Calabresi counters the
Wechsler-Choper political process analysis with observations about the recent
transformation of national politics. Calabresi contends that, while the political
process provides a meaningful outlet for state concerns and interests, relying solely
and the President to enforce federalism would vitiate the Tenth
on Congress 37
Amendment.1
First, the role of the national courts in reapportioning congressional districts,
coupled with political action committee C'PAC") financing of national political
campaigns, has diminished the power of state political entities.131 Successfully
waging an election campaign requires expensive financing supplied by PACs that
usually represent national specialinterests. Thus, a candidate for national office must
spend a substantial amount of time courting and developing these national special
interest PACs. As a result, modem senators and representatives have expanded their
constituencies to include national special interests as well as citizens in their home
states and districts. 39 This modem arrangement creates, in some cases, an
unresolvable conflict between national PAC interests and state and local interests.
PACs, like other special interests, will favor or disfavor state interests according to
the dictates of their substantive policy.
Moreover, the Wechsler-Choper analysis inadequately assessesthe degree to which
federalism concerns of state and local officials influence members of Congress and
the President With one eye closely scrutinizing each upcoming election and the
other eye focused on the annual budget, members of Congress and the President
ritually expand resources and dole them out to their constituents. In turn, voters
applaud the additional federal resources and reciprocate by feeding the re-electoral
appetite oftheir senators and representatives. 4 Furthermore, espousing or defending
136. See id. at 180-81.
137. See Steven G. Calabresi, 'A Government ofLimited and EnumeratedPowers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MicH. L. REv. 752 (1995).

138. See id. at 794.
139. See id.

140. See id. at 795-96 ("Pass a national speed limit, collect a donation from the insurance
companies. Pass a national drinking age, collect a donation from Mothers Against Drunk
Driving. Every breach of the constitutional fabric becomes anew fundraising opportunity and
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federalism principles at the behest of state and local officials cannot be clearly
articulated by news sound bites. 4'
A final reason the federal judiciary should not entrust the political process to
enforce federalism is that state and local officials may not pursue objectives
consistent with federalism principles. 42 State and local officials are, at times, more
43
interested in shifting responsibility and accountability to federal officials.
Moreover, state and local officials often seek portions ofthe federal largesse for state
and local constituencies. Inevitably, increased federal expenditures are attended by
correspondingly increased power and regulation at the federal level.'44
C. Increasingthe Role ofPoliticalProcessin Effective
FederalismEnforcement

Because neither state nor federal officials have great incentive to protect
federalism on a regular basis, the federal judiciary should not leave federalism
enforcement to the political process. Yet, the recent battle over E.O. 13,083
presented a rare opportunity for Congress and state and local officials to discuss
intergovernmental cooperation based on federalism principles. Though the political
process is an inherently limited method to protect state autonomy, Congress can still
improve the enforcement of federalism.
Congress should first reintroduce and then pass the Federalism Enforcement Act
("FEA"). FEA would require federal regulatory agencies to regulate only under clear
statutory and constitutional authority. Furthermore, FEA would direct federal
agencies to prepare Federalism Assessments whenever a proposed regulation would
have sufficient federalism implications. Lastly, FEA would require regulatory
agencies to consult with designated state officials when a proposed regulation has
sufficient federalism implications. The consultation requirement promotes
intergovernmental cooperation, allowing both states and the federal government to
find effective constitutional solutions to pressing problems. Though Reagan's E.O.
12,612 requires federal agencies to follow these guidelines, FEA would enshrine
these directives to prevent future executive branch usurpation.
In addition to promulgating FEA, Congress should enact legislation restraining
itself from passing legislation which infringes on state autonomy. This legislation
should take the form of a self-imposed Federalism Assessment which E.O. 12,612
currently orders federal agencies to formulate. Before leaving a committee, any bill
that has sufficient federalism implications, should include an assessment ofpossible
preemption conflicts with state law. A proper Federalism Assessment would weigh
the costs and benefits of federal legislation in the light ofpreexisting state measures.

a new television spot in one's campaign for reelection.").
141. See id.
142. See id. at 797.
143. See, e.g., Hearings,supranote 32, at 163 (Michael Horowitz stated that when the
Reagan Administration began to shift more authority and responsibility to state and local
officials through block grants, these same state and local officials protested because of
increased accountability).
144. See Calabresi, supranote 137, at 797.
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The Federalism Assessment would act as a self-disciplined check onunconstitutional
legislation.
Congress could also protect federalism by restricting the discretion federal
regulatory agencies currently exercise. Curtailing agency discretion would
necessitate carefully drafted and detailed federal statutes. Prudently written laws
would spare Congress the shock of regulatory agencies requesting tax increases to
pay for Congress's own vague mandates such as "universal Internet access."
Therefore, enactingFEA, limiting legislative preemption, and drafting more detailed
legislation would allow the political branches to enforce federalism more effectively
by themselves.
CONCLUSION

Congress and state and local officials effectively utilized the political process to
enforce federalism. E.O. 13,083 would have substantially altered federal-state
relations. Abolishing Reagan's E.O. 12,612 consultation requirement, preemption
safeguards, and the Federalism Assessment would leave states without important
protection from unnecessary and unconstitutional federal agency regulation.
Clinton's E.O. 13,083's nine non-exclusive conditions for federal agency
intervention would have given agencies far too much discretion in regulatory action.
The stealth promulgation of E.O. 13,083's mandates is largely responsible for the
states' angry reaction and Congress's efforts to neutralize the effect of the order. In
addition to the order's sweeping provisions, Congress sensed a threat to its power to
make law. E.O. 13,083 opened the door for additional executive orders ultimately
amounting to executive legislation. Facing a Congress controlled by the opposition
party, Clinton was forced to pass his initiatives as executive orders rather than
formally proposing legislation. Congress, for the most part, however, framed the
debate in terms offederalism. Arguing about state autonomy gave Congress another
means to protect its legislative power and ensure the separation of powers.
One can view Congress's efforts as a victory for the political process in enforcing
federalism. Congress and the "Big Seven" used hearings, bills, and resolutions to
,pressure the President politically into suspending E.O. 13,083. However, the
emergence of PACs, pork-barrel spending, and state officials wishing to shift
accountability to the federal government overrides the political process protections
envisioned by Wechsler and Choper. Although the political process cannot
consistently enforce federalism, Congress has a rare opportunity to address and
correct the current federal-state imbalance of power as well as protect against future
encroachments. 45 Legislative deliberation and judicial scrutiny, as well as the stroke
of the President's pen (in the case of E.O. 12,612), should act as the protectors of
federalism.

145. The head of a new executive order hydra has sprung in the form of E.O. 13,132. See
supratext accompanying notes 9-10.

